An economic analysis of crime in Hong Kong. by Lam, Kwok Wa. & Chinese University of Hong Kong Graduate School. Division of Economics.
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CRIME IN HONG KONG
by





of the Requirements for the Degree of
MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY
DEPARTMENT OF FnnNnMTCS





Economic analysis of crime assumes potential offenders
react to incentives according to our state-preference
theory. We have used quarterly time series data of offences
against property and the person for empirical testing. We
find that the probabilities of being imprisoned and fined
accompanied by lengthy imprisonment are important deterrence
factors for both catagories of crimes. Moreover, the labour
market conditions also affect the offence rate against
property.
The offence rate against property and the person are
measured by the number of cases reported per 1000
population. Simple linear, double logarithmic and semi-
logarithmic functional forms are used and they give us
similar results.
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Chapter I
In troduction
The economic analysis of crime has a much shorter
history than the sociological approach. Most economists
would agree that the appearance of Gary S. Becker's seminal
article Crime and Punishment: an Economic Approach
in 1968 was a starting point. A systematic study of
enforcement as an economic problem followed.2 In our
analysis, we assume a potential offender reacts to
incentives. The opportunities faced by him include
deterrence variables like probabilities of being caught,
fined, jailed as well as the severity of punishment; while
the environmental conditions affecting his devotion to
criminal activities include illegal and legal returns,
unemployment rate, etc. A simple time allocation model is
used and potential offenders are presumed to act as
expected-uti1ity maximizers.
In Hong Kong, the studies of crime were basically done
by social workers and sociologists. Host of these studies
are concerned with juvenile delinquency. Although juvenile
delinquency is a problem in our society, most of the crimes
are committed by adults. Researchers in Hong Kong have paid
a disproportionate 1y small amount of attention to adult
crimes. In 1980, the percentage of juveniles prosecuted for
property crimes out of all prosecuted was 19.4'., and this
was already the highest known figure. From 1983 to 1987, the
percentage remained below 13%
Our economic model assumes individuals behave
rationally. Offenders react to incentives just as we do. The
percentage of prisoners who have committed property crimes
more than once in the last two years is shown in table la.
Almost, half of the prisoners' population has criminal record
already. Ignorance is unlikely to be the excuse for these
hand core offenders
Table la
Percentage of recidivism within the last two years
for property crimes








































Source: Statistical Tables, Correctional Services Department
1.1 Period and Scope of Study
The period of study begins from the middle of 1975
until the end of 1987. There are two main reasons for such a
choice. In the first place, economic analysis of crime
suggests that the decision of criminal participation is
rational, A potential offender would determine his devotion
to legitimate and illegitimate activities based on costs and
benefits analysis. In the period chosen, our economy
experienced a lot of fluctuation and this inevitably
provided valuable information for empirical research.
Secondly, our model requires collecting data from various
sources and we are constrained by data limitation.
During the period 1975 to 1987, our economy
experienced three recoveries from recessions. Two of them
were caused by the oil crises in 197374 and 197980. Hong
Kong was no exception to the shock and the economy did
experience a very low growth rate. The recent recession in
1985 caused the real total Gross Domestic Product( GDP)
and per capita GDP growth rates to go down to 0.67. and -0.57..
However, Hong Kong has recovered quickly after each
recession. It was growing especially fast after the first
oil crisis. In 1976, the real total GDP growth rate reached
18.87.. In 1981( one year after the second oil crisis), the
real growth rate was 9.4 7. while in 1986( one year after
the recession in 1985), the corresponding figure was
11.87.°. The fluctuation has provided useful information for
analyzing the relation between the labour market conditions
and the crime rates.
Data limitation is inevitably the strongest restriction
on our period of study. We suspect that the unemployment
rate is a crucial factor in determining the crime rate
because the failure to achieve ends by legitimate means
would be substituted by illegitimate ones. The unemployment
figures are obtained from the Labour Force Surveys and the
General Household Surveys. The former, which commenced
operation in September 1975, were replaced by the latter
starting from August 1981. Therefore, the study could only
begin from the third quarter of 1975 using quarterly data.
Moreover, some important data in the Annual Statistical
Tables for 1988 of the Correctional Service Department are
still unavailable, so we cannot extend the period beyond
1987 in the meantime.
Following the initiation of the Four Modernization
Programmes in December 1978 and the adoption of the open
policy in 1979, China became one of our most important
sources of illegal immigrants, which has created many social
and economic problems. In 1979, the estimated number of
illegal immigrants was more than 110,000. These people were
mainly in their 20s or 30s.After Hong Kong abandoned the
touch-base policy on 23 October 1980, the number of
immigrants, either legal or illegal, has been brought under
control. The overall immigration( both legal and illegal)
reduced from 101,605 in 1980 to 33,150 in 1981. Table lb.
Tab 1 e lb
Number of Immigrants from 1979 to 1932
1979 1930 1981 1982
Net immigratior
from China
67,709 52,885 52 ,00' 51,356
Net immigration
from other countries
-1,122 -27,408 -23,400 -31,014
Illegal immigration
(estimated)
112,605 76,128 4, 546 2,997
Ba1ance 179,192 101,605 33,150 23,339
Source: 1982 Economic Background, p. 36
In a case study of 30 male offenders aged 15- 45 who
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were new immigrants from China between 1976 to 1983, there
were several factors which made this group of people more
prone to criminal activities. These factors included
cultural differences, low social status, lack of
incompetitiveness in the job market, poor living conditions,
no sense of belonging and poor communication with local
people.
1.2 Local Studies on Criminal Activities
The sociological study of crime has a long history and
there are a number of theories on the subject. However, we
would only describe one of them which has been applied in
Hong Kong some years ago. It is known as the Control Theory
by Travis Hirshi. Tne theory states that an individual is
constrained by internal and external controls. The former
include guilt, shame, etc., while external controls include
surveillance, supervision, etc.. Crime and delinquency are
undertaken by those who are least constrained. In other
words, the upsurge of criminal activities is caused by the
weakening of- bonds between individuals and various
institutions, especially family, community, school and place
of work.' The rising number of working women is expected to
weaken the family bond of children. The juvenile delinquency
rate could then be related to the female labour force
participation rate. In addition, the quit rate of students
also reflect the weakened bond between schools and students.
Therefore, both female labour force participation rate and
the students' quit rate would be included in our empirical
model.
Both theoretical and empirical researches on crime and
delinqency are relatively limited in Hong Kong. Local
sociological studies on criminal activities, especially
juvenile delinquency, were mainly based on questionnaires
and interviews. Among those available studies on juvenile
delinquency, the methodologies for hypotheses testing are
less satisfactory. A rather large scale study on juvenile
delinquency was done in 1974 based on the Control Theory
approach. Agnes Ng, who was the person-in—charge of the
research, had chosen two groups of adolescents( offenders
and non-offenders) between the age of 12 to 20 for a
matched sample design.
According to the Control Theory, there are four
elements which keeps us away( juvenile included of course)
from criminal activities. The elements are: (i) attachment
to others 5 (ii) commitment to social values and norms;
(iii) involvement in social activities; (iv) belief in the
moral validity of social codes.
The two groups of adolescents were asked about their
parental relations, school performance, leisure activities,
aspirations, etc. For each question, a chi-square testing
was made question by question to determine if there was any
difference between responses of both groups of adolescents.
Notice that the Control Theory as a whole has not actually
been tested.
The results were almost expected. Offenders usually
came from broken families, performed badly at school, got
along with triad members, had little aspiration about their
future, etc. The methodology of the research is less
satisfactory because the chi-square testing is based on each
characteristic rather than the Control Theory as a whole.
Although she claimed that her investigation assumed the
causes of crime and delinquency were mu1ti-factohia1, her
model was not tested in such a way!
In 1979, the juvenile crime rate climbed up suddenly
and a Working Group on Juvenile Crime was set up in late
1980's. The results published later indicated that all the
pre-conditions recognized in Agnes' paper still existed,
but the j uven ile crime rate has already increased by a lot'7.
In 1973, the juvenile crime rate, measured by number of
juveniles prosecuted per 100,000 of the juvenile (7-15)
age group, was 160; it became 478 in 1980s. In other words,
the empirical study could only list out some -different
characteristics between juvenile offenders and non¬
offenders. The method is unsuccessful in explaining the
change in crime rate.
Another study was launched in Tsuen Wan and Kwai Chung
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District in the late 1985 and early 1986 which intended to
study differences in parental supervision and schooling
between delinquent and non-delinquent youths. Two groups of
juveniles were chosen. The first group of 121 youths had
committed at least one delinquent act while the other group
of 58 had not.
The questionnaire was designed to investigate the young
people's leisure activities, family and parental conditions
and their relation with family members, etc. It was stated
in the introduction to the report that the study was not
meant to test any theoretical hypotheses. The report
consisted of tables summarizing the responses of juvenile
offenders and non-offenders. In other words, the set of data
collected is still waiting for further analysis.
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In a paper writ ten by HaroId Traver in 1980, the
author tried to explain the trend of violent and property
crimes by socio-economic changes during the late 50s and
In the paper, the housing( per 1000) and papulation
density were used to measure urbanization, Industria1ization
was measured in terms of per capita electricity consumption,
employment in manufacturing and per capita gross domestic
product. Economic conditions were measured by wages, price
level, number of vehicles ,TV, telephones per 1000 people.
Suspecting that the crime rates( violent and property)
were related to these variables, the author simply plotted
the crime rates against each of them. Some variables
exhibit a similar trend for one Deriod but not the other.
The author seemed to conclude that sacio-economic
variables were influential in the cyclical movement of crime
rates. However, the extent to which they were influential
was not addressed. Without any statistical testing, the
conclusion of the paper was quite vague.
Chapter 2
Theoretical Framework and Implications
Economic analvsis of crime beaan in the late 60s bv
Gary S. Becker10. He viewed the criminal participation as a
form of rational behaviour similar to other decisions in
labour market participation. In 1973, Isaac Ehrlich, whose
PhD dissertation in 19701 was based on Becker's concept
of rational criminal participation behaviour, published an
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empirical research paper on illegitimate participation.
In his paper, a time allocation model was set up and tested
empirically. He used cross-sectional data of the United
States of America on seven offences punishable by
imprisonment, namely: robbery, burglary, larceny, auto
theft, murder, racie and assault.
In the rest of the chapter, we would introduce
Ehrlich's model in the first place. Based on his model, two
other versions would also be discussed.
2.1 Ehrilch's Oneo-period Model
He assumed that an individual would divide his
available time between participating in two types of
markets, namely: legitimate and illegitimate markets. Both
of them require no training and entry cost, but the latter
market is more risky. If a person takes part in the
illegitimate market, he will receive a higher return but
also a probability of being caught and punished. Once 'he is
caught, the resulting wealth after punishment should be
lower than the wealth he would have acquired legitimately
with the same amount of time. The decision-making problem is
formulated by the state-preference theory
Each person has a fixed amount of time t at his
disposal. This amount would be the portion from which the
basic time-consuming activities( e.g. sleeping, eating,
etc.) are excluded. He can then devote a certain portion o
the disposable time to each activity based on his expected
cost and benefit analysis.
To begin our model, let us assume there are only two
states of the world. State A represents the caught state
which is unfavourable to the offender, state B is the not
caught state which is favourable to him. Let us assume that
the return from either market is positively related to one's
time allocation. In other words, a full-time robber would
have more loot from robbery than a part-time robber with
other things being held constant of course. Let t and t}
denote the time spent on illegitimate and legitimate market
with corresponding( returns as W(t) and W(t), the
individual's income in state B( i.e. not caught state)
would be the sum of both returns and his initial wealth,
says W. Notice that for an equal amount of time allocation
in both markets, return of illegitimate market should be
higher because of the risk. In other words, Wj_(t) W(t).
The payoff of the offender who is not caught is:
Once he is caught and convicted, he would have to pav
for his wrongdoings by means of a fine, an imprisonment,
psychological costs of feeling guilty, etc. Let us assume
all the pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs could be added up
in F£( t j:). The severity of punishment is positively related
to one's time allocation to illegitimate activities. This
implies that a full-time criminal would face. a more
severe punishment than a part-time criminal if both are
caught. Therefore,
As mentioned before, once the offender is caught, the
resulting wealth after punishment should be lower than the
wealth acquired legitimately with the same amount of time.
In other wards. lJi(t) W.•( 11— F( t).
Let the potential offender's subjective probability of
being caught is p. Corresponding1y, 1- p becomes his
subjective probability of getting away with crime.
The economic approach assumes that an individual
maximizes his expected uti1ity'EU(I) given his subjective
probability of different states to occur as well as the
subsequent payoffs.
To determine the optimal amount of time allocation on
illegitimate activities( tj_), we differentiate (1) with
respect to t.
Assuming an interior solution exists, we set the first
derivative to zero and obtain
For (3) to be a global maximum, it requires diminishing
legitimate and illegitimate wages, diminishing marginal
utility of real wealth and increasing marginal penalties
Appendix 1 for the second order condition).
The left-hand side of (3) represents the marginal rate
at which Ia can be transformed into 1 by reallocating the
time budget from legitimate to illegitimate activities. This
is the slope of the transformation curve in Xa, Xspace,
where Xa and X [3 stand for wealths in state A_ and B
respectively. The right hand side represents the
individual's marginal rate of substitution of wealth in
Figure 1 Optimal time allocation
state A, Ia, for wealth in state B, I, This is the slope
of the indifference curve in Xa, space.
The assumptions
and 0 ensure diminishing returns to both legitimate
and illegitimate activities. The transformation curve in
figure 1 is concave to the origin.
I he optimal allocation of time can be represented by
point B in figure 1 where the transformation curve
represents different combination of payoffs in both states
by altering the proportion of time in both activities.
If all time is spent in legitimate activities, t= 0,
then
other words, if an individual is not involved in any
criminal activity, his income would only depend on his
initial wealth W and legitimate labour income W(t). This
is represented by point A in figure 1. In this case, the
individual specializes in legitimate activity which is
characterized by Xa= X and point A would be on the 45°
line from the origin.
On the other hand, a full-time offender would have t=
Therefore, if he is caught, his income would
represented by point C in figure i.
otherwise
Notice that as an individual spends more time on
legitimate activities, the equilibrium position( point B)
would move closer to A and vice versa. His decision on this
time-allocation model depends on his risk preference and the
probability of being caught on the one hand and the returns
from both markets on the other.
His risk preference and probability of being caught are
described by the right-hand side of equation (3) while the
returns from both markets are described by the left-hand
side of the equation. We can see that a steeper indifference
curve and a flatter transformation curve would reduce one's
time spending on the illegitimate market, t. In such a set¬
up, it is interesting to find out the condition which an
individual just begins to participate in criminal
activities. This would happen whenever the transformation
curve is steeper than the indifference curve in figure i.
i.e.
At the margin, Xa= Xj-,. We rearrange the above
inequality and obtain
This implies that an individual would begin his
criminal career when the marginal legitimate return over the
marginal illegitimate return is greater than the expected
costs of punishment.
Since p F,-' 0, we have W,-' W-i', otherwise the
individual would have no incentive to engage in crime. In
the following paragraphs, we derive some theoretical
implications by altering the exogeneous variables in our
simple time allocation model.
2.1.1 Theoretical Implications for Offenders' Reaction
(i) An increase in the nrobabilitv of nunishment
Since a larger p does not alter the income when either
state occurs, the transformation curve is thus not affected.
However, it increases the probability of an unfavourable
state( being caught) to occur. The indifference curve
becomes steeper. The equilibrium point would move closer to
the 45° line so that lesser time would be spent on
illegitimate activities.
(ii) A more severe punishment
A marginal increase in punishment further reduces the
payoff if an unfavourable state( being caught) occurs.
Therefore, the transformation curve becomes flatter. In
other words, the additional time allocated for illegitimate
activities would produce less wealth( Xa) once the
unfavourable state( being caught) occurs. Point A remains
at its original position because it represents no criminal
activity involvement and the severity of punishment would
have no effect on such a person.
However, a severe punishment affects one's marginal
rate of substitution between wealth in state A for wealth in
state B as well. It reduces the income if an unfavourable
state occurs, i.e. Ia declines. Assuming risk averse
behaviour, a larger U'(Ia} increases the marginal rate of
subs ii. tu r_ ion between wealth in both states. This gives a
s teeper .i. nd 1 f f erencs cur ve wh i- h r educes t he t ime a 1 1 cc a tea
tor illegitimate activities tx, In short, a severe
punishment reduces the time allocated for illegitimate
activities through a flatter transf or.ma tion curve and a
steeper indifference curve. For risk-loving behaviour,
U'(Ia) decreases and the indifference curve becomes flatter.
The overall effect is onortain. The relationship between
risk preference and the slope of utility function can be
found in Green.
(iii) An increase in i 1 legitimate rewards
A better illegitimate reward Wj_(tj_) increases the
payoff for any level of non-zero tj_. Point A should net be
affected for the same reason mentioned already. Therefore,
we wouId have a steeper transformation curve pivoted at A
and this tends to increase tj_. However, Ia and k also
increase and both U'(Ia) and U'(Ik) would increase. However,
whether U'(Ia) U'(Ip) would increase cr not is
uncertain. Therefore, the overall effect is ambiguous.
The ambiguity is the result of the opposing income and
substitution effects. More illegitimate opportunities( an
exogeneous increase in Wj_( tx)) make the criminal prospect
more attractive but it also allows one to spend less time on
illegitimate activities in achieving one's goal. Our model
does not resolve this problem.
However, let us assume a dominant substitution effect
in this aspect. This means, other things unchanged, better
illegitimate opportunities increases one's time allocation
on criminal activities.
(iv) Better legitimate reward
The analysis is similar as in (iii) but now the
transformation curve pivots outward at point C. A better
legitimate prospect would induce people to work more. This
will increase t. However, it is also possible that they may
be rich enough to work less. Given a fixed amount of
disposable time t, a decrease in t means a corresponding
increase in t. Once again, we assume the substitution
effect is dominant. Therefore, a better legitimate reward
would encourage an individual to work more.
(v) Previous empirical analysis
The supply of crime has been estimated by using cross-
sectional data for various states in U.S.A.. Ehrlich used
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method for estimating the 1940
and 1950 criminal supply function. OLS, two-stage least
squares and seemingly unrelated regression were employed for
estimating the supply function in 1960. Besides Ehrlich's
paper, a detailed analysis as well as an early literature
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review can also be found in Anderson. A more contemporary
review on various theoretical set-ups and empirical models
could be found in Schmidt (1984)15. In Schmidt, part I of it
includes statistical analysis of criminal recidivism. Part
II reviews economic models of criminal behaviour in which
Ehrlich's and Becker's analyses are also included. Part III
estimates long-run and short-run cost functions for large-
scale Drisons.
2.2 Bartel's Model on Women and Crime
In the foregoing analysis, a person's disposable time
is assumed to be spent on legitimate and illegitimate
activities only. Ann P. Bartel argued that we could follow
the same analysis but dividing the disposable time for non-
market and market activities. The latter is subdivided
into legitimate and illegitimate activities. Non-market
activities include shopping, taking care of babies, etc. By
doing so, a person's family background becomes an important
factor of his criminal participation. Since men and women
play different roles in the family, certain family
characteristics may affect one's spouse and not the other. A
person's given amount of disposable time is now divided
among three activities: legitimate, illegitimate and non-
market activities.
In general, the implications derived in her paper are
ambiguous. For example, the author argued that since a
married woman works intermittently throughout her lifetime,
she would obtain lower wage rate in comparison with an
unmarried woman. Therefore, given a fixed amount of
disposable time on market activities, a married woman would
then spend a greater proportion of her time on illegitimate
activities. The question is that a married woman may also
spend more time on household activities( i.e. non-market
activities) than a single woman, such a scale effect
reduces time allocation on market activities as a whole (on
both illegitimate and legitimate activities). Thus, the
effect of low legitimate returns on a married woman's
criminal participation behaviour is uncertain.
Also, if a high female labour force participation rate
is caused by a low price of time at home. We expect a
positive scale effect on both legitimate and illegitimate
activities. However, since we do not have perfect
information on female legal wage rate. The high female
labour force participation rate can also be caused by a high
legal wage rate which produces a substitution effect towards
less time allocation in illegitimate activities. The
ambiguity has to be settled empirically.
2.3 WolDin's economic model of crime
Both Ehrlich's and Bartel's empirical models were based
on cross-sectiona1 data. Kenneth I. Wolpin has used annual
English data over the past 80 years for testing. In
addition, he decomposed the single probability of
apprehension and punishment into a number of deterrence
probabilities, namely: clearance rate, conviction rate,
imprisonment rate and fine rate. This is also the model we
are aoina to use.
An individual is assumed to maximize the following
expected utility function with four possible states. First,
he is not detected. Second, he is caught and sent to prison.
Third, he is caught and fined. Fourth, he is caught but set
free at the end. The symbols are defined in table 2.
If we differentiate the ex pec ted uti1ity function with











Imprisonment rate given prosecuted
Fine rate given prosecuted
Total wealth if one is not caught
Cost of trial
Imprisonment cost in monetary equivalent( psychic
cost inc1uded)
monetary fine
Let us define the various elasticities as follows:
In other words, the elasticity of the detection rate is
greater than the sum of the corresponding elasticities of
the imprisonment and the fine rates.
Our empirical models would study two broad types of
crime: offences against property and offences against the
person. We have to classify various types of offences in
this way because the data from.the Correctional Services
Department are categorized in such a manner. Offences
against property include: robbery with firearms, other
robberies, aggravated burglary, blackmail, arson, burglary
with breaking, burglary without breaking, theft(
snatching), theft( pickpocketing), theft( shoptheft),
theft from vehicle, taking conveyance without authority,
abstracting of electricity, theft from construction site,
theft of bicycle, other miscellaneous thefts, handling
stolen goods, deception, business fraud, going equipped for
stealing, possession of unlawful instrument and tampering
with vehicles. Offences against the person include: murder
and manslaughter, attempted murder, woundings, serious
assaults, kidnapping, cruelty to child, criminal
intimidation, abortion and other offences against person.
First, we would apply ordinary least square method to
estimate a crime rate equation. Second, a t-test would be
carried out on each regression coefficient. Third, a F-test
on the joint hypothesis that all coefficients of the
deterrence variables are zero would follow. Fourth, the
elasticities ordering( i.e. n n2+ nj) would be
tted.
Ehrlich argued that the probability of being
apprehended and convicted and imprisoned would be affected
by the activity level of criminal justice system( e.g.
police force) which is in part determined by the existing
crime rate. Therefore, he estimated a simultaneous equations
system to determine the supply function of crime. The
probability of apprehension and imprisonment is determined
in turn by the crime rate and various departmental
expenditures. However, Wolphin's results with English data
show that there is little difference between an ordinary
least square and two-stage least square estimation of the
crime rate. In our model, only a single equation is
estimated in which all the deterrence probabi1ities are
assumed to be exogeneous. but the simultaneity issue would
also be addressed.
2.4 The Empirical Model
10 test the hypotheses of the economic model, the
offence rate against property at time t (OAP-j.) is assumed to
be generated by the following process:
where A is a constant. DETECT, PRISON, FINE are the
detection, imprisonment and fine rates; LI is the length of
imprisonment in months. This is the group of deterrence
variables. E represents a number of environmental variables
summarized in table 3 and u. is the stochastic component.
Although the economic model is founded upon an individual
level, the absence of data at micro-level forced us to
estimate the supply function at the aqqreqate level.
DETECT, PRISON and FINE measure how likely an offender
will be caught, imprisoned, and fined. In general, these
three ratios measure how likely an unfavourable state
occurs. Notice that the detection rate( DETECT) is the
ratio of cases detected( property crimes) to cases
reported. The ideal proxy should be the number of offenders
caught out of the total. However, the pool of offenders
could never be known and we have to rely on the ratio
measured in terms of cases rather than offenders.
In an bhrlich's article( 1977c,pp.218-1?), he argued
that the magnitude of the errors in data were thought to be
proportional to the level of reported crimes. That is, the
magnitude of underreported and misreported crimes are
dependent of the level of reported crimes. In addition, as
the crime rate is getting smaller, law-enforcing agents
would have to pay more effort to lower the rate. In fact,
it is rare for a country, even with extremely severe
punishment, to have zero crime rate. Therefore, a functional
form which allows a diminshing marginal deterrent effect is
preferred. After transformation, the multiplicative
functional form becomes a log-linear form which would be
used for empirical estimation. The coefficients for various
independent variables becomes their corresponding
elasticities.
According to the Royal Hong Kong Police Force. A crime
is' detected' when: i. a suspect is arrested and charged
with the offence; or ii. the offender admits the offence
and the offence is 1 taken into consideration' by the court
; or iii. the offender has died, or has been committed to a
mental hospital before proceedings are instituted; or iv.
the (juvenile) offender admits the offence but the police
exercise discretion not to prosecute. In cases where an
offence obviously been committed by several people but only
one is arrested and charged, the crime is regarded as
'detected'. Also, if a suspect is prosecuted for an offence,
it is classified as 'detected' even if he is later
acquitted, or if for any reason the prosecution is not
proceeded with.
The severity of punishment LI is the median length of
imprisonment( in months) for property crimes. The data
have been grouped under broad headings( such as offences
property, offences against morality, offences against the
person, etc.) and the data on punishment for a specific type
of offence are unavailable. However, if we assume that
different types of property crimes are substitutab 1e to a
large extent, the median length of imprisonment should
reflect the severity of punishment. Moreover, information on
the amount of fine is not available, the length of
imprisonment LI should reflect the severity of punishment in
the year. There was one study made in 1979 about the
juvenile attitudes towards punishment. The conclusion was
... the young offenders view all punishments primarily in
in terms of severity to the exclusion of the other other
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dimensions such as rehabi1itation and deterrence...
However, our economic model assumes that punishment should
exhibit deterrent effect on a potential offender's decision
to participate in criminal activities.
The environmental variables included are female labour
force participation rate, male unemployment rate, number of
retail establishments per 1000 population and real median
income of production workers. The reasons for choosing the
above variables are as follows. As the number of working
women increases, they have more opportunity to have access
to valuables not belonging to them. For instance, a cashier
Table 3
Symbols for the Empirical Model
OAP offence rate against property
cases reported population ('000)
PERSON offence rate against the person
cases reported population ('000)
Deterrence variables include
DETECT detection rate
cases detected cases reported
PRISON imprisonment rate given prosecuted
no. of offenders imprisoned
no. of offenders prosecuted
100 7.
FINE fine rate given prosecuted
no. of offenders fined
no. of offenders prosecuted
100 7.
LI median length of imprisonment in months
Environmental variables E include
FLFP female labour force participation rate
( 30- 39 years old)
MUNE male unemployment rate( 20- 29 years old)
RETAIL no. of establishments in the retail trades
INCOME real median monthly income from production
and related workers, transport equipment
operators and labourers.
Dl, D2 dummy variables of 1 for the first, the second
and D3 and the third quarter, zero otherwise.
detailed description of variables in Appendix 7
has more opportunities to steal money than a housewife. This
is analogous to the Opportunity Theory suggested by
sociologists. A higher female labour force participation
rate implies that there are more illegitimate opportunities
available to women, but whether they have made used of them
should be tested empirically. The choice of women aged 30-39
years old is suitable because a woman at this age is likely
to be making decisions on child bearing. This is a major
factor which affects her labour force participation
decision. Thus, more variation in the participation rate is
expected for this age group of women.
The second environmenta1 variable chosen is the male
unemployment rate. The possible relationship of unemployment
19
and crime has been recognised long ago by sociologists.
20
Until 1963, Belton M. Fleisher used the American data to
test the effect of unemployment on juvenile delinquency. The
result was positive. His empirical model on juvenile
delinquency is one of the pioneering works in the economic
analysis of crime. A positive relationship is expected
between the crime rate and the unemployment rate because if
one is unable to get a job, committing crime would become
more attractive since he has' nothing to lose in terms of
labour earnings. Based on prisoners' characteristics, male
aged 20- 29 constitutes the largest group of prisoners.
With reference to the labour market, this group of people
are relatively less skilled. They are also less attached to
their jobs probably because they are less likely to be
breadwinners than men in the 30s or 40s. Therefore, the
unemployment rate for men aged 20 to 29 is chosen as an
explanatory variable of the crime rate.
To measure the return from illegitimate activities, we
use the number of retail establishments per 1000 population.
Since most of the property crimes committed are shoplifting,
thefts and burglary ,the number of retail establishments is
intended to measure the opportunities to steal. The choice
of variable is controversia1. There are authors who have
21 22
used average household income permanent income, number
23
of vehicles per 1000 population, etc. This is possible
because certain types of property crimes( e.g. stealing
vehicles in America) are popular in one country but not in
others.
From the Annual Statistical Tables( 1975 to 87) of
the Correctional Services Department, we can easily observe
that the majority of prisoners were men. Moreover, about
half the male prisoners were manufacturing and production
workers when they were caught for either property crimes or
crimes against the person as shown in table 4. Their jobs
require less skill or education and certainly provide less
reward. To measure the legitimate return, the real median
monthly income of production workers is therefore used.
Table 4
Proportion of craftsmen, production workers












































Source: Annual Statistical Tables, 1975- 1987, the
Correctional Services Department
The above is the basic structure of our empirical
model. Since men and women traditiona11y take up different
roles in our society. The model could be modified somewhat
to test the effects of economic variables which affect men
and women specifically. To avoid complication at this stage,
this part is left until equation (ia) is tested empirically.
Although the environmenta1 variables( e.g. female
labour force participation rate, male unemployment rate,
real wage, etc.) are conceptually important factors
affecting one's decision about stealing and other types of
property crimes, we would like to apply the same model for
offences against the person as well. Since these crimes are
sometimes by-products of property crimes( e.g. a
shopkeeper was stabbed when he discovered the burglar in the
scene). If this is so, the factors affecting the property
crime rate would also be those affecting crime rate against
the person. How good are the arguments of the property
crimes applicable here is uncertain at this moment.
Therefore, we would employ the same structure as equation
(la) to estimate the corresponding supply function of crimes
against the person. Of course, the deterrence factors,
namely: DETECT, PRISON, FINE and LI are those counterparts
of offences against the person.
B is a- constant and v-f- is the stochastic component.
rhanpr T
Empirical Results
We first present the results of the overall offence
rates against property and against the person. We employ
cases reported per 1000 population as a measure for the
crime rates. Afterwards, we would modify the model a bit for
male and female crime rates on both offences against
jerry ana tne person.
Due to data limitations, we have to resort to quarterly
data which began from the third quarter of 1975 until th
end of 1987.( ,1988 Statistical Tables from the Correctiona
Services Department was not available at the time of thi
research). The supply function for the offence rate agains
property (la) and against the person (2a) are estimated b
ordinary least squares method. The results are tabulated i
table 5( column 1 for the property crime rate and column
tor the offence rate against the person).
x utrences against property ana tne person
We first discuss the empirical results for the offence
against property (la)( Table 5, column 1). All variabli
are in logarithmic values. -Although some variables a
insignificant, most of them have the expected sign and t
adjusted coefficient of determination is quite high( R
0.762). The significant PRISON and FINE coefficien
indicate that the higher the chance of imprisonment a
fine, the lower would be the property crime rate. T
severity of punishment LI, measured bv the length
Log linear functional form for offence rates,



























































T—valuer arm in brackets.
imprisonment, also has its expected effect. Detection rate
DETECT has the expected negative coefficient though
insignificant. The insignificance of DETECT on the crime
rate can be explained in several ways.
Firstly, the crime rate need not be reduced by an
increase in detection rate, the mere presence of policemen
may be good enough to deter crime. In such a case, the
relationship between the crime rate and the detection rate
would be very weak. Also, a larger number of police
reporting centres facilitate victims' reporting. Assume the
police force is able to detect a certain number of cases
with the available resource, the higher reporting rate
implies a decline in the overall detection rate even though
the police force remains efficient. Both explanations
suggest a more complicated relationship between crime rate
and detection rate than we have claimed in our theoretical
model.
The two measures on.i1 legitimate return( RETAIL) and
legitimate( INCOME) return of a poten tial of fender have
insignificant coefficients. This result is not unexpectec
because we could never know how much an offender could have
earned if he had not broken the law, i.e. his alternative
leaitimate return. A aood measure of illeaitimate
opportunities or returns is difficult to find as well.
Different proxies have been used in various papers,
including average household income, permanent income, number
of motor vehicles registered per 1000 population, etc. Ir
most cases, there exists a positive relationship. However,
most of these empirical tests are based on cross-sectional
but not time series data.
The two significant environmental variables included in
the model is female labour force participation rate and male
unemployment rate. If the female labour force participation
rate reflects the relative price of a woman staying at home,
a high participation rate implies that women spend more
time in market activities and therefore more time allocated
to both legitimate and illegitimate activities.
Another argument for the positive relationship between
the female labour force participation and crime rates is
that juvenile offenders usually came from family with
working mothers. The lack of parental care, especially the
mother's supervision, increases the chance for youngsters
going astray. Therefore, the female labour force
participation rate may partly reflect the poor care and the
subsequent wrongdoings of youngsters. If this is the case,
FLFP is capturing both female and juvenile criminal
participation behaviour. In addition to FLFP, the
participation rate for women aged 20 to 29 has also been
included as an explanatory variable but the t-value for this
variable is extremely small.
Not only has shoplifting become the most popular
female property crime, the age of women prosecuted for such
an offence has been increasing. We can see in table 6 that
the percentages of female prosecuted in the age group below
16, 16-20 and 21-30 are dec 1 ining, while the corresponding
Table 6
Number and percentage of women prosecutec
at various age groups
Age
J Year









































































The corresponding percentage are shown in brackets.
Source: Royal Hong Kong Police Review, 1982- 1987 issues.
figures for the age group 31- 60 and above 60 are climbing
Note also that women in their 20s and 30s are likely t
cover a large portion of those prosecuted for the offences.
The positive effect of male unemployment rate oi
property crime rate is expected. When a person i
unsuccessful in the legitimate market, he may turn to th
illegitimate one. Certainly, we are not saying that a
unemployed person must become a thief. The failure i
legitimate market simply makes the prospect of illegitimat
activities more attractive.
Thea ornnnmif- mnrip 1 n f rn'mp p» 1 c=n mpkpt; pi rf i t i n r~ t i n r
between incapacitation and deterrence of punishment.
Incapacitation means a person does not commit crime because
he is locked up in jail. If this is so, the negative
relationship between the crime rate and various
probabilities is no longer the result of a potential
offender's reaction towards incentive. To argue that
offenders do react to incentives, we should consider the
negative and significant elasticity of the fine rate given
prosecuted. The elasticity of -0.118 for FINE means that for
every 17. increase of the fine rate, the property crime rate
would be reduced by 0.118.. Since fines should have no
incapacitative effect, any retarding effect of fine should
then be deterrent in nature. In other words, potential
offenders find it less attractive to commit crime because of
the corresponding high chance of being fined and not because
of physical incapability to do so. Since we are using
quarterly data, three dummy variables( D1, D2 and D3) are
included in cur model in table 5 far bath types af offence?
The seasonal factors are insignificant to explain tf
property crime rate.
The F-value for the null hvDothesis that all foui
deterrence variables( DETECT, PRISON, FINE and LI) ar
zero is 5.651. The hypothesis is rejected at both the 57. an
17. significance level. The restriction on the elasticitie
of detection, imprisonment and fine rates (i.e. b b2
b3) is not supported( F= 0.8S; accept the null hypothesi
at the 57. significance level).
24
One of the criticisms made about the economic model?
of criminal activities is the choice of logarithmic linear
functional form which is used in this study. Here we also
use the same set of data on a simple linear and a semi-log
form to see if the relationship still holds. Simple linear
form refers to using natural values of all variables in the
regression; semi-log form is the case with the dependent
variable in logarithmic values. The results are shown in
table 7 with equation (la) reproduced for reference. We
could see that different functional forms give us similar
resu1ts.
If juvenile delinquency is an important component of
today's criminal activities, we should include an additional
25
variable to reflect its seriousness. In Agnes Ng's paper,
she found that juvenile offenders usually quit school ir
Forms one or two. In terms of his time allocating decision,
quitting from school imparts a positive scale effect on tim«
Tab 1 e 7
Three functional forms

















































































adj R 0.762 0.758 0.754
DW 2.37 2.23 2.32
T-values are in brackets
Table 8
Offences against property














































































adj 0.762 0.761 0.75
DW 2.37 2. 46 2.48
available to be spent on other activities, including
illegitimate ones. If this conjecture is true, the quit rate
from school should exhibit a positive relationship with the
overall crime rate through the contributory effect of
juvenile delinquency.
6
An additional variable FM2. Quit rate for Form 2
students, is included in equation (la)( Table 8, column 2)
for estimation. We can see that although FM2 turns out to be
insignificant, the positive sign conforms to our
ex pec tation.
Although juvenile delinauencv has drawn much attention
nowadays, the problem may have been exaggerated. Prosecuted
juveniles( aged under 16) occupy about 127. of all
prosecuted for property crime. In table 9, we have shown
the percentage of prosecuted juveniles. The proportion has
increased by a lot at the turn of the century and it
attained 19.47. (not shown) in 1980. However, in most of the
years, the percentage was around 127.. Juvenile delinquency
occupies only a small portion of all crimes committed.
Therefore, if the quit rate( FM2) has any effect on
juvenile delinquency, a change in the trend of adults
crime rate may easily overwhelm such effects.
In our introduction( chaoter 1.1). we have mentioned
the sudden influx of illegal and legal immigrants from the
mainland China before the abolition of the touch-base policy
on October 1980. From time to time we hear about the
criminal activities committed by them. An additional dummy
Table 9
Proportion of juvenile (aged below 16) prosecuted
for property crimes




11.9 16 .l 17, 2 12. 5 11.3 12. 1
variable( D) was introduced to see if the influx of
immigrants during the period concerned contributed to the
crime rate in a way different from our empirical setup
perhaps they did not understand our legal system, did not
accustom to the way of life, did not make friends, etc.
Since the new immigrants may take some time to learn the
illegitimate skills, we set a dummy of 1 for the period 1979
to 1981( 1981 was the first year after the abolition of
touch base Dolicv in 1980) and zero otherwise.
The empirical results in table 8( column 3) show that
although the dummy variable( D) has a positive sign, it is
insignificant. There are two reasons for such an
observation. Firstly, the influx of immigrants during the
period 1979 to 1981 contributes little to the property
crimes. Secondly, our model may have already reflected their
behaviour. In other words, all the arguments on deterrence
and the labour market are equally applicable to the new
immigrants and these make the dummy variable redundant.
The second category of offences studied are those
against the person. We could see in table 5( column 2)
that only the imprisonment rate is a significant deterrence
factor for crime rate against the person. The fact that
female labour force participation rate has an insignificant
effect on offence against the person is consistent with our
observation because the criminal activities committed by
women are usually non-violent( e.g. shoplifting). The
insignificant effect of male unemployment rate shows that an
unemployed person may use illegitimate means to acquire
money but less likely to use violent ways. One possible
reason for positive sign on RETAIL and INCOME is that if
crimes against persons are by-products of property
crimes, then good economic conditions which signal a higher
potential illegal income may induce more violence being
applied. This may be true even when the overall crime rate
against property may be unrelated to such economic
conditions.In addition, the crime rate is especially low in
the first but high in the third quarter.
The F-value for the null hypothesis that all deterrence
variables( DETECT, PRISON, FINE and LI) are equal zero is
1.723. The hypothesis cannot be rejected at both 57. and 17.
significant level. The restrictions on the elasticities
ordering of detection, imprisonment and fine rate is not
supported in our model( F= 0.05; accept at the 57.
significant level).
for estimation are shown in table 10. The results are
similar.
Table 10
Three functional forms for
offence rate against the person
( N= 50)
log













































































adj R Q.822 0.820 0.823
DW 1 .75 1.81 1 .78
T-values are in brackets
3.1.1 The Simultaneity Issue
In the last section, the detection rate( DETECT) is
insiginficant in explaining crime rates. Since the number of
detected cases and the number of reported cases may be
affected by the resource allocation to the police force as
well as the crime rate itself, DETECT may be endogeneous. If
this is so, estimating our model with a single equation
would give biased coefficients. Let us assume that DETECT is
determined by the crime rate, the number of policemen per
1000 population( POL) and the per capita real expenditure
( POLEXP) of the Royal Honq Konq Police Force.
A two-stage least square estimation method is used but
the detection rate remains insignificant. In addition, POL
and POLEXP are used to predict DETECT which in turn becomes
an instrumental variable in explaining the crime rate. By
doing so, DETECT still remains insignificant. The empirical
results are shown in Appendix 2.
For each regression, we have also included an one-
period lag of the crime rate as an explanatory variable.
However, this lag variable turns out to be insignificant in
both equations.
3-2 Male Offence Rates against Property and the Person
Two additional environmental variables enter our model
with respect to the crime rates committed by men and women.
The first variable is the marital status and the second is
the percentage of children aged 0 to 4. As mentioned before,
Ann P. Bartel was the first person who employed cross-
sectional data in the United States to study female criminal
participation rate.
In this study, we have to assume that the family
structure of offenders is not systemmatica1ly different from
our population. Since the marriage decision is most likely
to be made between the age of 25 to 34, the marital status
of the male population is measured by the percentage of
married men aged 25 to 34 out of the total male population,
lv! Iv!2 5 3 4 fv!. In addition, the presence of children is measured
by the percentage of children aged 0 to 4 out of the whole
population.
The crime rate for men and women could not be measured
by the cases reported per 1000 population because it may be
difficult to know which cases are committed by men or women
at the moment of reporting. Thus we approximate the male
crime rate by the number of men prosecuted( aged 16 or
above) divided by 1000 male population. The two dependent
variables are MEN( referring to offence rate against
property) and MALE( referring to offence rate against the
person).
The detection rates DETECT for both offences are the
same as before. Since we have no exact measure on the
probability that a male offender is caught because the total
number of male offenders is unknown. The detection rate,
which is measured in terms of cases rather than persons,
should be able to reflect how likely the offender( either
male or female) would be caught by the police. The male
imprisonment and fine rates are measured similarly as
before, but the relevant figures refer to male offenders
specifically. The above mentioned variables are summarized
in table 11.
The empirical results for offences against property and
offences against the person committed by men are given in
table 12. Notice that the crime rate is measured in terms of
number of men prosecuted and not cases reported which has
been done in the last section.
For the property crime rate( table 12, column 1), we
could see that all the deterrence variables, namely DETECT,
MPRISON, MFINE and ML, have the expected negative signs.
However, only -the probability of imprisonment( MPRISON)
indicates a significant effect. Among the environmental
variables, the male unemployment rate( MUNE) exhibits a
positive effect on male crime rate as before. In addition,
INCOME which is insignificant in the last section( though
with expected sign) becomes significant now. INCOME is a
measure of the legitimate earnings of a production worker.
Committing crimes would be discouraged if an individual
receives a higher real income legitimately. The marital
status of men( MM2534M) does not have any significant
effect on their criminal participation against property.
However, the presence of young children( P04P) exhibits a
marginally significant positive effect on the crime rate.
This may be caused by the heavier family burden to




MALE male offence rate against the person
no. of male prosecuted
100 7.
male papulation
MEN male offence rate against property
no. of male prosecuted
100 7.
male population
ML median length of imprisonment for men in months
MM2534M percentage of married males aged 25 to 34
MFINE male fine rate given prosecuted
no. of male offenders fined
100 7.
no. of men prosecuted
MPRIS0N ma1e imprisonment rate given prosecuted
no. of male offenders imprisoned
100 7.
no. of men prosecuted
( FEM, W0M, FL, MF2534F, FFINE and FPRIS0N are the
corresponding variables of MALE, MEN, LI, MM2534M, MFINE
and MPRIS0N for women)
MUEMPC male( aged 30 to 59) unmemp1oyment rate
MUNE male unemployment rate( as before)
P04P percentage of population aged 0 to 4
DETECT detection rate in percentage( as before)
INCOME real median monthly income for production workers
( as before)
RETAIL no. of retail establishments per 1000 papulation
( as before)
Table 12
Male offence ratest ia i c u i i cmuc i a lco



























































ad j R 0.830 o.
DW 1. 30 1.38
T-values are in brackets
adjusted for the first order autocorrelation with p=0.48
The F-value of the null hypothesis that all four
deterrence variables( DETECT, MPRISON, MFIME and ML) are
zero is 13-79. The hypothesis is rejected at either the 57.
or 17. significance level. The property crime rate estimated
by a simple linear and a semi-log functional fcm can be
found in Appendix 3.
With respect to offences against the person( Table 12,
column 2), either an increase in the probability of
imprisonment or length of sentence reduces the male crime
rate against the person. The F-value of the null' hypothesis
that all four deterrence variables( DETECT, MPRISON, MFINE
and ML) are zero is 3.08. The hypothesis is rejected at
either the 57. or 17. significance level. The restriction on
the elasticities of detection, imprisonment and fine
rates is not supported in our model( F= 1.84). The
results with simple linear and semi-log functional forms
could be found in Appendix 4.
Since all the environmental variables are insignifcant,
the regression equation is re-estimated by taking the group
of deterrence variables and a seasonal dummy as explanatory
variables. The result adjusted by the first order
autocorrelation( p= 0.55) is:
MALE= 0.048- 0.013 DETECT- 0.461 MPRISON- 0.066 MFINE
(0.39) (0.24) (-8.38) (-1.95)
All the deterrence variables, except the detection
rate, are significant in reducing crime rate. The
coefficients of MPRISON is much greater than MFINE. This
implies that imprisonment is more powerful than fine in this
asoec t.
3.3 Female Offence Rates against Property and the Person
Similar to the previous section, the female offence
rate is measured by the number of women prosecuted( aged 16
or above) per 1000 female population.
The detection rate for crimes against property and the
person are the same as those used in chapter 3.1 because
there is uncertainty about the sex of the offender until he
( or she) is apprehended. Notice that for those years with
no woman fined, we set FFINE equals 0.000001 in order to
make the log linear functional form operational.
In the repression, the male( aaed 30 to 59)
unemployment rate (iUEMPC is used instead of the female
unemployment rate. Since a woman works intermittently
throughout her life, her being unemployed may be caused by a
number of non-economic reasons and this may not indicate any
financial difficulty in her family. On the contrary, men
aged 30 to 59 are strongly attached to the labour market and
their unemployment rate is 'more likely to reflect the true
economic condition affecting one's( and his wife's,if any)
decision on criminal participation. When we are studying the
male offence rates in the last section, the males
unemployment rate in the age group of 20 to 29 is chosen
because they constitute the largest portion of the male
prisoners' population. However, the age of female prisoners
is not concentrated at any particular range, therefore, an
unemployment rate which reflects more general economic
conditions is preferred. Secondly, the legitimate earning is
now measured by SERV( real monthly income of a service
worker) because the statistical figures indicate that the
majority of the female prisoners were service workers when
they were caught. In table 13, we can see that although this
occupation is already the most popular type of activity,
using SERV to approximate women's legitimate return has
overlooked many others. For example, many of them are
27
economically inactive or seeking jobs too
This is in contrast to the choice of INCOME as the
legitimate return for men where half of all male prisoners
were production workers( Table 4). Education level is
sometimes used to measure the wage rate of an individual.
However, since we use quarterly data for 11 years only,
little quarterly variation is expected in the education
variable. The schooling variable is therefore abandoned.
We must admit that SERV is not a good measure of female
offenders' labour earning. In a study of 67 young female
offenders by the Prisons Department in 1980( later it has
became the Correctional Services Department), quite a large
proportion of the girls( 40.37.) were dance hostesses with

















































Source: Annual Statistical Tables, 1975- 1987,
Correctional Services Department.
Table 14
Female nf fpnrp rplpp
against property and the person
in log 1inear form
against
nrnnprf v fir- 'I
against
the person (2c)


















































adj Rx r o L. n 0. 585
dw 1 .67 1 .46
T-values are in brackets
Our economic model suggests that high detection, fine
and imprisonment rates would bring a potential offender into
unfavourable states of the world. In table 14( column 1),
the effect of the detection rate DETECT on the female
property crime rates (lc) is significantly positive. This
is paradoxical.
The variable measuring illegitimate opportunities
RETAIL, which is the number of retail establishments per
1000 population, also exhibits a positive relationship with
the female property crime rate.
One possible explanation is that the detection rate for
shoplifting is very high, because once a shopkeeper realizes
that a person .is shoplifting, that person is very likely to
be caught. Shoplifting is different from burglary in the way
that there is almost no time lag between the crime being
committed and the victim realizing his bad fortune.
This is confirmed by the data provided by the Royal
Hong Kong Police Force( Table 15). As a consequence, it is
likely that only detected crimes are reported in most cases.
Table 15
Detection Rate of Shopliftinc
Year ! 1981 1982 1983 1984 198= 1986 198
I
!Detection
! Rate in 7. 96.0 97.: 97.£ 96.1 97.i 95. 5 93.£
Source: Royal Hong Kong Police Force Review, 1981 to 198
issues.
The empirical results show that the length of
irnpr isonmen t has an expected negative significant effect on
the female property crime rate( Table 14, column 1). Since
men aged 30 to 59 are usually strongly attached to the
labour market, their being unemployed reflects poor economic
conditions. Therefore, the positive significant MUEMPC is
reasonable. The percentage of married women exhibits a
a negative re1 ationship, this may reflect their involvement
in household activities. The presence of young children P04P
has a scale effect in reducing a woman's ti-me on both
legitimate and illegitimate activities. This is reflected by
a negative significant coefficient of the variable.
The F-value of the null hypothesis that all four
deterrence variables( DETECT, FPRISON, FFINE and FL) are
zero is 14.24. The null hypothesis is rejected at both the
57. and 17. significance levels.
Referring to the female offence rate against the person
(2c) in table 14( column 2). The length of imprisonment
and the RETAIL gave us the expected significant sign. The
family background, which is measured by MF2534F and P04P,
has little effect on female crime rate against the person.
Among different types of female offences against the
person committed, serious assaults have taken up over 807.
from 1976 to 1986. This figure reached 907. in 1986 and
declined to 677. in 1987. However, this is still the most
popular crime committed by female offenders. If we believe
that these serious assaults are directly or. indirectly
related to property crimes, the positive effect of the
number of retail establishments per 1000 papulation (RETAIL)
on the female offence rate becomes clear.
The F-value for the null hypothesis that all four
deterrence variables (DETECT, FPRISON, FFINE and FL) are
zero is 3,243. The hypothesis is rejected at 5. but not the
17. significance level. The restrictions on the elasticities
is not supported at the 57. or 17. level( F= 2.82).
Similar to previous analysis, two other functional
forms, namely, simple linear and semi-log forms could be
found in Appendices 5 and 6.
Chapter 4
Explaining Movements of Offence Rates
Based on the empirical results obtained in chapter 3,
we can try to explain movements in the crime rate in terms
of those deterrence and environmental variables employed in
the study. Offences against property would be our first
concern. Next, the movement of the crime rate against the
person would be explained.
4.1 Property Crime Rate
Besides some fluctuation, the movement of property
crime rate is quite clear. We would first look, at the male
property crime rate as measured by the number of men
prosecuted per 1000 male population. Next, we would study
the movements in female property crime rate and the overall
crime rate as measured by the number of cases reported per
1000 population.
4.1.1 Male Property Crime Rate
As mentioned earlier, we do not know the offender's sex
when a crime is reported. To measure the extent of male
participation in illegitimate activities, one has to rely on
the male prosecution rate. Figure 2 shows the rate
graphically. The rise from 1978 to 1984 and the subsequent
fall were mainly the result of the unemployment rate as
shown on figure 3. In addition, during the rising period,
the imprisonmenmt rate declined from 317. to 157..
Figure 2
Male property crime rate( MEN)
men prosecuted per 1000 male population


























Male unemployment rate( MUNE)

























4.1.2 Female Property Crime Rate
The female property crime rate was clearly rising
throughout the period, except for a small downturn in 1986.
Figure 4
Female Drooertv crime rate (WON)
women prosecuted per 1000 female population

























Since shoplifting has become the most popular female
property crime, increasing number of retail establishments
per capita is a factor. In addition, the percentage of
children aged 0 to 4 has declined steadily from 97. in 1976
to cnly 7.27. in 1987. Couples having fewer children makes
the wife less committed to her family. In our empirical
model, the decline of P04P implies that a woman would have
more time to spend in both legitimate and illegitimate
activities.
figure 5
Percentage of population aged 0 to 4 (P04P)

























4.1.3 Overall Crime Rate
The movement is quite clear. The property crime rate
rose from 1977( 2.29 cases per 1000 population) to 1983
( 3.25 cases per 1000 population, figure 6). The property
crime rate has grown by 427. per 1000 population. What has
happened in these six years? Since most offenders are men,
the overall crime rate in figure 6 is similar to figure 2.
The falling imprisonment rate and the- rising unemployment
rate are important factors.
Among different types of property crimes, shoplifting
is the one which has drawn considerable attention recently.
Before 1982, the Royal Hong Kong Police Force Review had no
such item explicitly in their Review. In 1982, the number of
shoplifting cases reported was 2800. The corresponding
figure in 1987 reached 7077. In other words, shoplifting has
been increasing at 257. on average annually. The average
growth rates for men and women prosecuted for shoplifting
were 137. and 247., respectively. Shoplifting has become the
most popular property offence committed by women. We believe
that the low relative price at home for women is a reason
for the upsurge of property crime rate. Although we cannot
measure such a price directly, a lower price of time at home
could be reflected by a high female labour force
participation rate. In our empirical model, such a
participation rate( which reflects the price at home) does
provide a positive significant impact on the female property
crime rate.
Figure 6
Overall Drooertv crime rate (OAP)
[cases reported per 1000 population

























4.2 Crime Rate against the Person
The movement of crime rate against the person was
unclear. Probably because the crimes against the person
involve violence and are more serious than property crimes(
e.g. theft), much attention has been paid in order to avoid
any clear upsurge. Anyway, our model shows that the
imprisonment rate and the severity of punishment seem to be
promising in deterring crimes against the person.
In addition. the sex comnosition of men -and women
prosecuted is fairly stable over the last decade. The ratio
is roughly 1 to 10, i.e. only one woman is prosecuted when
every ten men are prosecuted. With respect to punishment in
1978, there were 368 men imprisoned while the corresponding
number of women imprisoned was only seven.
4.2.1 Male crime rate against the person
In our study, we have tested the same model on crime
data against the person. Most of the environmental variables
turn out to be insignificant. Only the imprisonment rate and
the length of imprisonment are shown to be significant in
deterring offences against the person
From 1976 to 78, the number of men prosecuted increased
by 147. (from 0.33 per thousand in 1976 to 0.38 per thousand
in 1978) as shown in figure 7. This upsurge may be
explained by the decline of the imprisonment rate
accompanied by the decrease in the severity of punishment
(figure 8 and 9). From 1978 to 1981, the male prosecution
rate decreased by 37. on average annually. During this
period, the imprisonment rate remained stable but the length
of sentence has been doubled from 5.8 to 10.4 months.
Figure 7
Male offence rate against the person (MALE)
men prosecuted per 1000 male population


























Male imprisonment rate (MPRIS0N)
men imprisoned per men prosecuted in


























Median length of sentence (1V1L)
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4.2.2 Female crime rate against the person
Although our economic model cannot explain the female
crime rate against the person very well, the length of
sentence seems to be an important factor. From 1978 to 1981,
the crime rate has fallen by 207.. The median length of
Figure 10
Female offence against the person (FEM)
women prosecuted per 1000 female papulation

























imprisonment has increased from 12 months in 1978 to 20
man ths in 1981.
The second upsurge occurred from 1985 to 198. In this
period, the crime rate has increased by 35., while the
median length of imprisonment decreased from 27 months to
5.6 months. It seems that the severity of imprisonment is a
crucial deterrence factor for crimes against the person.
4.2.3 Overall Crime Rate against the Person
Instead of using the number of men and women being
prosecuted, the crime rate against the person can be
measured by the number of cases reported per 1000
papulation. From 1981 to 1984, an upward movement is
observed because both male and female crime rates were
climbing, figure 11. Although our economic model performs
less well in explaining the crime rate against the person,
it shows, that a higher chance of receiving lengthy
imprisonment is useful in suppressing the rate.
Figure 11
Overall offence rate aaainst the person( PERSON)
cases reported per 1000 papulation



























The outstanding features of the economic analysis of
crime is the inclusion of probabilities and consequences of
various states of the world which are usually neglected in
sociological investigations of the subject. In the research,
we have studied two broad categories of offences, namely:
offences against property and against the person. The
overall performance of our economic model is satisfactory,
we are able to show a negative relationship between
deterrence variables and the crime rate. However, the
r-pcfrirf inn nn the plflqfiriHpc; rflnnnt be verified.
The set of deterrence factors performs quite well in
explaining the overall property crime rate. About 107. of the
variation can be explained by the fine rate, the
imprisonment rate and the length of sentence.
On the other hand, the set of environmental variables
can explain 327. of the overall variation while the
unemployment alone can explained about 97..
However, our economic model seemed to perform less well
with respect to the offences against the person. The labour
market conditions do not affect the decision of committing
crimes against the person very much. Only the high
imprisonment rate and severity of punishment were promising
in suppressing offences against the person.
The number of women prosecuted for crimes aqainst th
person was about 107. of the figure for men in 1987. This
ratio remained quite stable throughout our study e.g. 107. in
1980 and 117. in 1976. This is in contrast to the growing
number of women prosecuted in property crimes.
The above observation is understandable because
offences against the person usually involve physical
violence. Owing to the physical limitation of a woman, she
is less likely to resort to violence. In contrast,
shoplifting( the most papular female property crime)
requires little physical strength and cost of entry. Witt-
growing opportunities available and leniency of our criminal
justice system, the female property crime rate is expectec
to increase.
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Appendix 1
To show equation (3) represents a global maximum, we
ifferentlate (2) for the second order condition. Assume
Appendix 2
Two-stage least squares on offence rates against
























































adj R2 0.743 0.830
DIaJ 2.27 1.76
T-values are in brackets
Appendix 5
Male property crime rates estimated by


























































adj R2 0.921 0.905
DW 1. 22 1. 10
Appendix 4
Male crime rate against the person estimated by


























































ad j R2 0.748 0.761
DW 1. 52 1 4R
T-values are in brackets
Appendix 5
Female property crime rate estimated by

























































adj R~ 0.928 0.962
DW 1. 13 1.66
Significant coefficients are marked with asterisks.
Appendix 6
r-emale crime rate against the person estimated by


























































adj R2 0.606 0.614
DW 1. 55 1. 53
Significant coefficients are marked with asterisks.
Appendix 7
C dummy of 1 for quarters beginning from 1979 tc




1 for the first quarter and zero otherwise
1 for the second quarter and zero otherwise
1 for the third quarter and zero otherwise
DETECT niiArfprl v data on detection rate calculated bv
dividina numher of raeee renorted bv number of cases
detec ted.
Source: Hong Kong Monthly Digest of Statistics, various
issues.
FEM quarterly number of women prosecuted..( against the
person) divided by 1000 female population. The quarterly
data of women prosecuted is estimated by the annual
percentage of women prosecuted (against the person) times
the quarterly number of people prosecuted( against the
person).
Source: Hong Kong Monthly Digest of Statistics and Royal
Hong Kong Police Review, various issues.
FL median annual length of imprisonment for women in
mon ths.
Source: Annual Statistical Tables published by the
Correctional Services Department.
FM2 quit rate of Form 2 students. This is the
percentage decrease between number of Form 2 students to the
number of Form 1 student in the previous year.
Source: Education Department
FINE number of offenders fined( men and women aged 15
or above) divided by the corresponding number of people
prosecuted (against property against the person).
Source Hong Kong Monthly Digest of Statistics, various
issues.
FFINE one quarter of the annual number of women fined
(against property against the person) divided by the
corresponding quarterly number of women prosecuted.
Source: Annual Statistical Tables published by the
Correctional Services Department and Hong Kong Monthly
Digest of Statistics.
FLFP quarterly data on the proportion of female labour
force members in the female population aged 30 to 39.
Source: Labour Force Survey and General Household Survey,
various issues.
FPRISON one quarter of the annual number of women
imprisoned( against property the person) divided by the
corresponding quarterly number of women prosecuted.
Source: Annual Statistical Tables published by the
Correctional Services Department and Hong Kong Monthly
Digest of Statistics.
INCOME calculated by dividing the median monthly
income of production and related workers, transport
equipment operations and labourers by Consumer Price Index
(A). The income includes salary or wages, bonus,
commission, overtime, tips and other cost allowances except
housing allowance and New Year bonusdouble pay.
Source: monthly incomes from Labour Force Survey and
General Household Survey; CPI(A) from Hong Kong Monthly
Digest of Statistics, various issues.
LI median annual length of imprisonment for both men
and women in months.
Source: Annual Statistical Tables pub 1ished by the
Correctional Services Department.
MALE quarterly number of men prosecuted( against the
person) divided by 1000 male population. The quarterly data
of men prosecuted is estimated by the annual percentage of
men prosecuted (against the person) times the quarterly
number of people prosecuted( against the person).
Source: Hong Kong Monthly Digest of Statistics and Royal
Hong Kong Police Review, various issues.
MEN quarterly number of men prosecuted (against
property) divided by 1000 male population. The quarterly
data of men prosecuted is estimated by the annual percentage
of men prosecuted (against the property) times the quarterly
number of people prosecuted (against the property).
Source: Hong Kong Monthly Digest of Statistics and Royal
Hong Kong Police Review, various issues.
MFINE one quarter of the annual number of men fined
( against property the person) divided by the
corresponding quarterly number of men prosecuted.
Source: Annual Statistical Tables published by the
Correctional Services Department and Hong Kong Monthly
Digest of Statistics.
MF2534F From the last quarter of 1981 onwards, we divide
the number of married women aged 25 to 34( available in
quarterly data) by the corresponding female population.
Before the 4th quarter of the year, census and by-census
provide corresponding figures for the first quarters of
1971, 1976 and 1981, the rest is then estimated by taking
the arthmetic mean of the available census and by-census
data.
Source: 1971, 1976 and 1981 census and by-census; General
Household Survey( Appendix), various issues.
ML median annual length of imprisonment for men in
months.
Source: Annual Statistical Tables published by the
Correctional Services Department.
MM2534M From the last quarter of 1981 onwards, we divide
the number of married men aged 25 to 34( available in
quarterly data) by the corresponding male population.
Before the 4th quarter of the year, census and by-census
provide corresponding figures for the first quarters of
1971, 1976 and 1981, the rest is then estimated by taking
the arithmetic mean of the available census and by-census
data.
Source: 1971, 1976 and 1981 census and by-census; General
Household Survey( Appendix), various issues.
MPRISON one quarter of the annual number of men
imprisoned( against property the person) divided by the
corresponding quarterly number of men prosecuted.
Source: .Annual Statistical Tables published by the
Correctional Services Department and Hong Kong Monthly
Digest of Statistics.
MUEMPC quarterly data on the proportion of unemployed men
aged 30 to 59 in the male labour force.
Source: Labour Force Survey and General Household Survey,
various issues.
MUNE quarterly data on the proportion of unemployed men
aged 20 to 29 in the male labour force.
Source: Labour Force Survey and General Household Survey,
various issues.
OAP number of cases reported( against property)
divided by 1000 population.
Source: Hong Kong Monthly Digest of Statistics, various
issues.
PERSON number of cases reported( against the person)
divided by 1000 population.
Source: Hong Kong Monthly Digest of Statistics, various
issues.
PRISON number of offenders imprisoned( men and women
aged 15 or above) divided by the corresponding number of
people prosecuted (against property against the person).
Source: Hong Kong Monthly Digest of Statistics, various
issues.
P04P percentage of children aged 0 to 4 out of the
total population( annual data)
Source: Hong Kong Monthly Digest of Statistics, various
issues.
RETAIL The number of retail establishments per 1000
population. An establishment is an economic unit which
operates under one single ownership or control in one
principal kind of business. Activities major groups in
retail trades include foodstuffs, alcoholic drinks and
tobacco, fuel, clothing, footwear and allied products,
consumer durables and other consumer goods.
Source: Hong Kong Monthly Digest of Statistics, various
issues.
SERV calculated by dividing the median monthly income
of service workers by Consumer Price Index (A). The income
includes salary or wages, bonus, commission, overtime, tips
and other cost allowances except housing allowance and New
Year bonusdouble pay.
Source: monthly incomes from Labour Force Survey anc
General Household Survey; CPI(A) from Hong Kong Monthlv
Digest of Statistics, various issues.
WOM quarterly number of women prosecuted (against
property) divided by 1000 female population. The quarterly
data of women prosecuted is estimated by the annual
percentage of males prosecuted (against the property) times
the quarterly number of people prosecuted( against the
property).
Source: Hong Kong Monthly Digest of Statistics and Royal
Hong Kong Police Review, various issues.


